Tim Harford is a senior columnist for the Financial Times. His long-running column, ‘The Undercover Economist’, reveals the economic ideas behind everyday experiences. Harford’s first book, The Undercover Economist, has sold one million copies worldwide in almost 30 languages. He is also the author of The Logic of Life, Dear Undercover Economist, Adapt and most recently, The Undercover Economist Strikes Back. In this free-wheeling interview with Forbes India, Harford discusses the ideas he explores in his latest book The Undercover Economist Strikes Back, from why he feels that stimulus packages in the Western world have been far too small to why money does buy happiness to why Henry Ford was the man who invented unemployment.
Q. One of the most interesting parts of your book is where you talk about the babysitting recession. What is that all about?
The babysitting recession was first discussed in an article published by Joan and Richard Sweeney in the 1970s, but it has been made famous by Paul Krugman. There was a babysitting co-op in Capitol Hill, Washington DC, which suffered a severe and lasting depression. Couples would keep track of who was babysitting for whom by exchanging babysitting tokens; however, there weren’t enough tokens in the economy. Almost everybody wanted to babysit for other people, accumulating a few more tokens as a reserve, before they spent any tokens themselves. But of course the arithmetic does not work: Somebody has to go out or there is no economy at all.
Q. What drew you to this example?
A number of things are interesting about this example—notably that a total economic breakdown could be fixed by a simple policy tweak: Printing more tokens. [Paul Krugman has more recently tended not to mention the end of the story: The co-op printed too many tokens and ended up suffering from a serious inflation problem. But that is more of an interesting sting in the tale than a refutation of the entire example.] In The Undercover Economist Strikes Back, I use the babysitting recession as a nice simple example of a Keynesian recession in which there is some dysfunction in the way the economy works—a dysfunction that can be fixed by governments printing money or perhaps borrowing and spending money. Some commentators believe Keynesian recessions are logically impossible; this is nonsense and it is nice to have a simple counter-example.
Q. Another interesting part is about the prison camp recession. What is that all about?
The prison camp I talk about was in Germany during the Second World War. The economic activity in the camp—a bit of production, but mostly trading items sent to prisoners by the Red Cross—was analysed in quite a brilliant article by one of the prisoners, Robert Radford, who published his findings a few months after the war ended.
The prison camp is almost the perfect counter-weight to the babysitting co-op. Trade in the prison camp worked amazingly well. There were well-understood prices and middlemen ensuring that prices in different parts of the camp tended to converge to similar levels. At one stage, coffee was worth more outside the camp in the cafes of Munich than it was inside the camp. That meant gains from trade, and coffee began to go “over the wall”—the prison camp had an export trade! Despite various attempts from senior officers to regulate trade and, particularly, fix prices at levels they regarded as fair, they were flexible and refused to respect any social or ethical conceptions of the “just price”. This was close to a perfect market. And yet… and yet the prisoners nearly starved to death.
Why they starved is not hard to understand. The parcels from the Red Cross began to dry up as the war progressed. Food and cigarettes both became scarce. In the last desperate days, there were few goods and prices fluctuated wildly. Finally, the US Army arrived and liberated the prisoners.
Q. But what does all this have to do with a modern economy?
The point is that there are two conceptions of what a recession really is. One conception is Keynesian, like the babysitting co-op: Some internal malfunction that needs fixing. But another conception is Classical: That economies fluctuate not because of anything wrong within the economic system itself, but because of policy errors or external shocks. Of course, the prison camp is an extreme example of a recession caused by an external shock, but modern economies are subject to technological changes, fluctuations in the price of basic commodities, and, of course, financial shocks from a banking crisis.
Q. Where do the babysitting recession and the prison camp recession meet? What are the policy lessons one can draw from them?
Q. Can economic growth carry on forever?
(This story appears in the 13 December, 2013 issue of Forbes India. To visit our Archives, click here.)